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workers' wages in the manufacturing sector. 
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1 Introduction 
The present master thesis aims to answer the following research question: what is the impact of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on wages? To this aim, we analyze the effects of FDI on average 
wages in the manufacturing sector in 33 different countries for the period between 2002 and 
2008
1
 and we conceptualize existing literature on the topic, distinguishing between neoclassical, 
political economy and sociology approaches. 
 Mainstream economic literature has argued openly in favour of FDI, underscoring that 
along to increased capital, FDI operates as a channel of technology diffusion that leads to 
permanent higher labour productivity and wages (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2005). In contrast, a 
heterogeneous group of scholars, ranging from sociologists to political economists have stressed 
that foreign investment decreases bargaining power of labour causing a decline on wages 
(Seguino, 2007; Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007).The effects of FDI on wages are estimated using the 
panel ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects method. In order to explain effects on wages, we 
include data on employment, inward FDI flows and stock, domestic capital, education and trade 
openness. 
 The present study differs from existing literature in three aspects: First, the study 
examines the effect of manufacturing FDI on manufacturing wages, instead of using aggregate 
economy FDI figures which mismeasure the effect of FDI on wages. By making use of data from 
the International Trade Centre (ITC), we are able to provide more accurate estimates of FDI in 
the manufacturing sector. Secondly, this study examines the effect of FDI on wages considering 
both domestic and multinational firms, while most previous studies have focused on the effects 
of FDI on either domestic or multinational firms with firm-level data and for a single or few 
countries (e.g. Aitken et al., 1996). This way, past studies cannot draw economy-wide 
conclusions about the overall wage effects of FDI and firm-level datasets do not allow for cross-
country comparisons.  Thirdly, this study distinguishes developed and developing countries. 
Most previous studies concentrate their analysis either on a specific region or developed 
countries (e.g. Tintin, 2012; Teckan, 2010 and Mehmet and Tavakoli, 2003). The small number 
of studies that do include developing countries, fail nonetheless to consider the specifics of FDI 
effects in developing countries. Given China’s importance in the global manufacturing sector, a 
specific analysis of this country will be made. However, data mismeasurements suggest that 
results should be taken with caution. 
                                               
1 FDI can be defined as "an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest of a 
resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy other than of the investor. The 
direct investor's purpose is to exert a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise resident in 
the other economy"(ITC, 2013). 
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 The introductory section presents an in-depth analysis of globalisation trends in capital 
deregulation and investigates the past two decades of development of the manufacturing sector. 
Section 3 analyses the theoretical and empirical background of the relationship between FDI and 
wages. Section 4 presents data sources and definitions. Section 5 will study the model and the 
empirical analysis. In Section 6 methods will discussed. Finally, section 7 concludes by 
presenting policy recommendations as well as discussing limitations of the current study and 
identifying areas for future research. 
 As a result, this master thesis will enable the reader to understand the effects of FDI on 
workers' wages in the manufacturing sector. 
2 Globalisation trends  
In this section we depict recent globalisation trends; capital flows, regulations and wages. We 
provide specific information of manufacturing sector wages and FDI in the data section. 
2.1 Capital trends 
The deregulation of capital flows is probably the most important global change of the last 20 
years. During this period, the US government and international financial institutions promoted 
neo-liberal policies and enshrined them in the Washington consensus. This particular view of 
globalisation deems necessary that governments "increase foreign direct investment by reducing 
barriers" and also "the abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict 
competition (except in the areas of safety, environment and finance)" (George, 2007). As these 
views were not shared by many governments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
international financial institutions introduced conditionality of finance assistance to the 
completion of these policies (George, 2007). National policy changes that promote FDI include: 
easing foreign ownership of assets, reducing sector restrictions, the approval of procedures for 
foreign investment, easing operational conditions, stabilization of foreign exchange, promotion 
measures (including incentives), guarantees and favourable corporation regulations (Kobrin, 
2005)
2
. Figure 1 shows the number of national policy changes from 1992 to 2008. National 
policy changes are representative of world policy making prevalent trends. During the past 20 
years, national policy changes were directed at easing FDI. Deregulating policy changes 
prevailed during the whole period with the sole exception of the ITC crisis which saw a sharp 
                                               
2
 Corporation regulations refer to corporate governance, stock exchanges and financial market laws. 
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decrease in deregulations. Capital deregulation has paved the way for higher levels of FDI in the 
world.  
 
Figure 1 National policy changes, 1992-2008 (Number). 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2011) Note: Red line denotes the number of national policy changes that 
promote or deregulate FDI. Green line denotes the number of national policy changes that restrict 
or regulate FDI. 
 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of FDI inflows since 1980 onwards for developing and 
developed countries. Three things stand out from the FDI inflow analysis: First, FDI inflows 
already took off in the 1990s. In 1990, total world FDI inflows amounted to around 176 billion 
dollars. Only twenty years later, this figure multiplied by eight, adding to a total of 1,433 trillion 
dollars (UNCTAD, 2011). Second, although most of the world FDI flows originate and are 
directed to developed countries, the proportion of FDI going to developing countries has been 
gradually increasing. Developing countries received about 20% of world FDI in 1980s. This 
number increased to 32% during 1992-1994 and reached 37% in 1997 (United Nations, 1999). 
FDI inflows in developing countries between 1986 and 1997 increased from $10 billion to $163 
billion and they accounted for about 45% of”total net foreign resources flows” to developing 
countries in 1997 (Perkins et al., 2001). Third, FDI inflows in developed countries showed a 
steep increase before the ICT and current crises indicating the different nature of FDI inflows. 
FDI represent significant sums in developing countries and have surpassed ODA in importance 
as a source of financing. 
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Figure 2 FDI inflows in current USD for developed and developing countries 1980 - 2011 (Million) 
 
     Source: UNCTAD (2011) 
 
2.2 Labour workforce trends 
Alongside the liberalisation of capital flows, the global workforce has doubled. This is due on 
one hand, to the world rapid population growth (especially in developing countries) and the fall 
of the "Iron Curtain". On the other hand, it is due to the incorporation of countries like Russia, 
China, India and other emerging country workers’ to the global markets (Freeman, 2005 and 
Friedman, 2006). This additional 1.5 billion people plus the fact that supply of capital has 
virtually remained unchanged has contributed to the lowering of the share of wages in the 
aggregate product as a whole. From the US, to Japan and the EU countries, all developed 
countries suffer from declining labour incomes, while corporate profits are more robust 
(Freeman, 2005). In developed countries, labour shares declined from about 75% of national 
income in 1975 to about 65% prior to the current crisis. In developing countries the picture is the 
same. Average labour shares of developing countries declined from 62 per cent of GDP in the 
early 1990s to 58 per cent just before the crisis (ILO, 2013). However, even if there is a decrease 
in the labour share, there were increases in average wages. Figure 3 shows how real wages in the 
world increased 2.06 percent per year between the year 2000 and 2011. Real wage increases 
concentrated in developing countries and specially in two regions: Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia and Asia.  
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Figure 3 Cumulative Real Wage Growth between 2000 and 2011: Average of the world and developed 
economies. 
 
    Source: ILO (2013) 
 
 The puzzling fact is that labour shares are declining everywhere whilst wages are 
increasing. This is due to the broken link between wages and labour productivity. Increased 
productivity of labour is not transferred into a proportional increase in wages or in other words, 
workers and their families are not receiving their fair share of the wealth they create. Figure 4 
shows the cumulative real wage and labour productivity growth in developed countries. The gap 
between productivity and compensation of workers is clearly increasing, probably indicating that 
gains from globalisation are not distributed evenly between capital and labour owners.   
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Figure 4 Trends in growth in average wages and labour productivity in developed economies  (index: 1999 = 100) 
Source: ILO (2013) Note: Since the indices refer to a weighted average, developments in the 
three largest developed economies (United States, Japan and Germany) have a particular 
impact on this outcome. Labour productivity is measured as output per worker. 
 
3 Theory  
This section will first analyse economic theories on the capital mobility effects on the labour 
market. Then, some of the most recent empirical studies are presented. The issue of globalization 
and wages has renewed importance. Forgotten in the last years, the recent economic crisis has 
brought fresh urgency to the debate about the effects of foreign capital flows and real wage 
movements.  
 
3.1 Theoretical approaches 
The debate about the effects of capital mobility in the recipient economies started already in the 
1960s. Originally, FDI was understood as the expression of monopolistic activities of 
multinational corporations. Since then, different fields of study have developed alternative 
theories to explain its effects on wages.  
 The following sections include a general review of literature on the effects of FDI on 
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wages according to three ad hoc approaches we distinguish in the social sciences literature; the 
neoclassical approach, the political economy approach and the sociological approach. 
3.1.1 Neoclassical approach: technology spillovers 
The neoclassical literature of the effect of FDI on wages can be divided into two: direct and 
indirect effects. If we consider standard neoclassical theories, wages are depicted in the 
following way: W=P*MPL, where P represents the price of final goods and MPL is the marginal 
product of labour. From here, real wages are: W/P=MPL, which means that any increase in the 
marginal productivity of labour increases real wages (Tintin, 2012). The direct effects have to do 
with the accumulation of capital as well as faster restructuring of the economy (Vijaya and 
Kaltani, 2007)
3
.  
 However, FDI is considered to have indirect effects on wages through tecnhological 
spillovers. This research field explains that along with foreign capital, multinationals bring many 
intangible assets i.e.-knowledge and organizational skills-. These in turn make local labour force 
permanently more productive (Aitken et al., 1996). When workers move from foreign to local 
firms they take this acquired technology to local companies (Liu, 2008). Thus, FDI will have an 
additional impact on wages through technological spillovers
4
.  
 Increases of wages have been conferred additional positive attributes in the neoclassical 
literature. For example, foreign investors are esteemed to pay higher wages to local workers are 
to decrease labour turnovers and reduce labour market frictions; to attract the most productive 
workers that may have preferences to work with local companies because of cultural or language 
factors; and to have good public relations with society and local governments which constitute 
their potential local costumers (Decreuse and  Maarek, 2008; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004 and 
Lipsey, 2004). 
3.1.2 Political Economy approach: bargaining power theory 
According to political economists, prevailing neoclassical theories omit social, cultural and 
institutional variables that are behind the actual process of capital movements. Thus, any 
technical analysis has to incorporate the social dimension of the process. This is, the relationship 
between social classes and groups between them and their institutions. 
                                               
3 In traditional trade models countries gain from competing in the international markets through specialisation, 
economies of scale, comparative advantages and price reduction of commodities that are produced more efficiently 
abroad. If we consider the Stolper-Samuelson model, the relative factor rewards change with the movement from 
autarky to free trade benefiting factors in trade-oriented industries. In the Mundell model, factor movements have a 
similar effect on wages (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994; Krueger, 1983). 
4 In models with differentiated labour input, the effects of FDI on wages may also depend on sector differences due 
to changes in the demand of skilled and unskilled labour (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). However, this literature aims 
to explain wage inequalities more than absolute effects. 
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 In relation to FDI, the political economy approach underscores the imbalance between 
capital´s high mobility due to ongoing capital deregulation with respect to labour which suffers 
from natural (language and culture) as well as institutional (immigration laws) barriers to move. 
This approach argues that wages are the result of the bargaining process between employees and 
employers and the outcome is dependent on the power that these two actors have. Whilst 
working hours are specified in working contracts, these do not contain the actual level of work 
and effort that is put during these hours (Reich, 1981; Bowles and Gintis 1990)
5
. In this way, a 
labour contract is not directly enforceable and follows a "contested exchange". Employers and 
employees follow a bargaining process in which actual work, effort and wage are the outcomes. 
According to this approach, FDI would be a variable measuring bargaining power
6
.  
 There are three the factors studied to pressure the bargaining power of labour down: the 
threat of capital to relocate or outsource, the increase in the mobility of capital and the 
consequent increase in the elasticity of labour demand. The political economy literature has long 
criticised that increase in productivity translates to wages (Reich, 1981; Bowles and Gintis, 
1990). This literature argues that relative bargaining power of capital and labour is not accounted 
for. 
 Firstly, the threat of capital to relocate or outsource. Initially proposed by Blecker (1997). 
It considers that wages can be affected by firms threat to relocate production. The threat takes 
place even if the firm finally decides  not to move. Seguino (2007) suggests that this mechanism 
is behind a low-wage-low productivity trap. The idea is that an increase in FDI leads to lower 
wages and thus productivity growth. Accordingly, the decline in productivity takes place for two 
reasons. In the first place because firms face less pressures to make investments that raise 
productivity. In the second place because deregulation of FDI permits companies to outsource 
their production.  
 Secondly, Vijaya and Kaltani (2007) argue that capital deregulation has made capital 
owners uphold increasing power when entering a market. With the shift in the relative 
importance of domestic to international markets, wages are no longer seen as a source of 
demand, but as a cost item and capital owners will move to markets with low wages. This way, 
FDI inflows have negative effects on wages in all countries. 
 Thirdly, Mehmet and Tavakoli (2003) argue that FDI deregulation has made labour 
demand more elastic. The fact that many countries have cut restrictions on foreign capital has 
                                               
5 This political economy approach has been applied by Reich (1981) to find that divisions amongst workers have a 
negative impact on wages in the U.S. because these divisions lower the collective bargaining power of labour. 
6 This type of approach matches with Rodrik´s (1999) finding that democracies pay higher wages because workers 
have in general stronger bargaining power in democracies. 
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allowed that MNC´s can benefit from lower wages in labour abundant countries, leaving 
production in others. In this way, FDI net inflows would have no effects wages. Considering the 
unlimited labour supply of certain developing countries as opposed to industrialized economies, 
the increased elasticity demand of labour is bound to push wages down in developed countries 
but leaving wages in developing countries in subsistence levels. 
 
3.1.3 Sociology approach: dependency theory 
In the sociology field, FDI has been analyzed in the context of Neo-colonialism in which capital 
from developed countries is used to perpetuate control over developing countries. Known as the 
capital-dependency theory since the influential work of Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), this 
approach considers that through the repatriation of profits and interests multinationals extract 
surpluses from developing economies. Moreover, foreign capital prevents the recipient country 
from developing a coherent internal economic structure and production process. Instead, it 
allocates resources according to the exporting interests of multinational companies. 
Consequently, opportunities to foster important industries and create comparative advantages are 
lost in the long run. Some sociologists have raised their concerns over the use of FDI inflows as 
a measure and consider that FDI stock reflects more the long-run negative effects of the 
dependency theory (Dixon and Boswell, 1996). 
 Table 1 summarizes the effects of FDI on wages following implications of the three 
approaches. 
 
Table 1. Effects of FDI on Wages 
 Neoclassical approach Political 
Economy 
approach 
Sociology 
approach 
FDI Stock + - - 
FDI Inflows + - +/- 
    Note: "+" stands for positive effect of FDI and "-" stands for negative effect of  FDI. 
 
3.2 Previous research  
Having presented the theories involved, we discuss some of the recent studies about the FDI 
effect on the labour market.  
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 Neoclassical approach 
Some empirical studies on FDI technological spillovers have found important spillover effects 
for skilled workers but there are mixed findings on the spillover effects for low-skilled workers 
(Hale and Long, 2008). Additionally, there are few studies in the neoclassical literature that 
research on developing countries.  For example Aitken et al. (1996) find negative spillovers in 
Mexico and Venezuela for manufacturing industries whilst Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001) find 
positive effects in a firm-level cross-section of Indonesian firms
7
.  
 Tintin (2012) finds positive effects of FDI on average annual wages, minimum wages and 
labour income share for fourteen OECD countries between 1990 and 2010. However, he finds 
greater effects of FDI on average wages than on minimum wages suggesting that FDI might be 
behind wage inequalities.  
 
 Political Economy approach 
Vijaya and Kaltani (2007) make a panel-data analysis that studies the effects of capital 
movements in manufacturing wages finding a negative effect. The reasoning to focus on such a 
sector is because it is more likely to suffer from capital deregulation than non-tradable sectors or 
those that employ high-skilled workers. The analysis if from 1987 and 2000 and it covers mainly 
developed countries. They test the impacts of both the ratio of FDI to GDP, FDI inflows and 
stock on wages. There is an important issue in this paper. The specification analysis uses 
logarithms on all variables. The problem is the loss of observations as the logarithmic 
transformation of negative values generates missing values. This can potentially be a source of 
sample selection bias. Interestingly, only FDI inflows are found statistically significant whilst 
they do not find negative effects of FDI stock. In general terms, results are not conclusive on the 
negative effect of FDI.   
 Seguino (2007) also finds this relationship in a panel data fixed effects and GMM 
estimation for different manufacturing industries in 37 semi-industrialized economies. 
Additionally, she investigates the relationship between low productivity and low wages for 
different manufacturing industries. In order to obtain reliable estimates she conducts a robustness 
check taking out countries listed as tax haven´s. She finds that bargaining power differs between 
industries. Such characteristics determine whether FDI will have a positive or negative effect on 
wages. Contrary to Vijaya and Kaltani (2007) she makes use of FDI stock variable instead of 
FDI inflows. 
                                               
7 For a good review on spillover effects on wages read Lipsey and Sjöholm (2005). 
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 Brofenbrenner (1997) provides empirical evidence of the threat theory for unionization in 
the US. The effect was higher in "mobile" industries such as communications and labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries with easy entry and exit. Interestingly enough, only 3% of the firms 
actually exited the US market after unionization which means that the sole threat was sufficient 
to keep wages down. Other empirical findings on the threat effect in developed economies are 
Choi (2001), Gopinath and Chen (2003) and Harrison and McMillan (2004). 
 Mehmet and Tavakoli (2003) provide a different empirical analysis using aggregate data 
to see the effect of FDI on wages for Asian countries to date. Instead of looking just at the effects 
of FDI on wages, these authors measure the elasticity demand for labour with and without FDI in 
China, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand between 1970 and 1998. They find that with the 
inclusion of FDI labour demand becomes more elastic. As they have data for several years in 
each country, they perform their analysis with different pooled cross-sections. 
 
 Sociological approach 
The empirical evidence of the dependency theory has been mixed. Different conclusions have 
taken place depending on the use of FDI flows, stock or rate. The latter is the ratio of flows to 
the stocks. For example, Dixon and Boswell (1996) give evidence of the capital-dependency 
theory finding a positive impact of FDI flows on GDP growth but a negative impact of FDI 
stock. 
 Part of the previous literature considers the effect of FDI on wage inequality. We 
consider that measuring the effect on wages as opposed to economy-wide measures such as Gini 
coefficients allows for a more subtle understanding the mechanisms through which FDI causes 
inequalities and primarily because we want to consider the effects on the manufacturing sector 
which has been in the centre of the globalization debate all along. 
 This study concerns the effects of FDI on wages. However, it may also happen that 
changes in wages have an impact on FDI. Accordingly, this effect can be positive or negative. 
Negative effects can be identified with the Race to the Bottom Hypothesis (RTB). This is, the 
cost of labour is a major factor for attracting FDI. Thus, countries reduce labour regulations in 
order to attract FDI. Several authors find evidence of the RTB hypothesis.  
 To sum up, there are diverse opinions on the impact of FDI on wages. Results vary 
depending on choices of countries an variables. FDI stock is more likely to capture long-run 
effects of FDI on wages than FDI inflows. FDI inflows are potentially endogenous due to short 
run fluctuations. Although new research is increasingly aware of sector and industry differences, 
data for sector analysis of wages and for skilled and unskilled labour are in many cases 
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unavailable. Due to these limitations, we will use aggregate data to see the effects of FDI on 
manufacturing wages.  
4 Data 
Data was collected from different sources
8
. We use average monthly wage data from the UNIDO 
Industrial Statistics Database (2013) and average monthly earnings data from the ILO 
LABORSTA Database (2013) to construct two distinct variables
9
. In order to make them 
comparable we follow the procedures of Yang, et al. (2010). Ideally, we would use wages per 
hour but this data is not available by UNIDO (2013) and is scarce in ILO (2013). Thus, we 
resume to use average manufacturing wages per month as our unit of comparison. This 
represents a defect in the data as we are not taking into account the hours worked in each country 
and consequently, wages per hour are likely to differ from monthly wages. 
 UNIDO (2013) reports total annual wage bills in the manufacturing sector of each 
country. We obtain annual individual manufacturing earnings by dividing total annual earnings 
by the total number of employees in the manufacturing sector and then we obtain monthly 
earnings by dividing this number into 12: 
 
             
                       
                            
 
 
 UNIDO´s (2013) definition of wages include all payments in cash made to employees 
during a year in relation to work done for the firm. The payments include direct wages and 
salaries, remuneration for time not worked, in kind payments, bonuses and donations, housing 
allowances and family allowances and in kind transfers paid directly by the employer. 
 For ILO (2013) data there are different definitions of earnings and wages but we take the 
former for our analysis. The difference between both is that overtime payments are not included 
in the wage rate. Consequently, in order to obtain earnings per month from wage rates per month 
and daily wage rates we need to account for overtime payments. We proceed in the following 
way: 
 
 For wage rates per day: 
                                               
8 For a concise description of variables used and the sources please refer to the data annex. 
9 Information of UNIDO (2012) is found at /http://www.unido.org/statistics.html/. ILO (2012) data is found in 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/. For word saving purposes and in order to avoid using excessively both terms, in other 
sections we refer to both terms as wages. 
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 We assume that the daily working hours is 8. Further, 4.3 weeks per month is calculated 
by dividing 52 weeks a year by 12 months. 
 
 For wage rates per month: 
 
                   
             
      
                            
 
 We assume that the weekly working hours are 40 (8 hours per day and five days  per 
week). The underlying assumption is that overtime hours are paid at the same rate as regular 
ones. 
 
 For Earnings per hour: 
 
                                                              
 
 Data on working hours are not complete for some countries. For example, Thailand hours 
of work are only reported for the years 2002 and 2003. We take the hours worked in the last of 
the year's available. A weakness of our definition of both earnings and wages is that it excludes 
the employers contributions paid to social security, insurance and  pension schemes. UNIDO 
(2013) reports data on compensation of employees which includes these aspects. However, 
information is only available for a small group of countries (Yang et al. 2010).  
 A greater concern are the "composition effects" (ILO, 2013). The problem with 
calculating national average earnings is that it may reflect changing in the wage-earning segment 
instead of recording changes in wages. The result is that national estimations underestimate wage 
losses. 
 Despite its growing importance, FDI data is scarce and when existent, it is not publicly 
available. FDI inflows and stock data are taken from the International Trade Centre database 
(2013). ITC´s Trade Map is often used by policy-makers in conducting research. However, less 
known is the Investment Map (2013). ITC´s (2013) database reports information on 
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manufacturing FDI since 2002. Most assessments on FDI and the manufacturing sector use 
aggregate FDI values provided by UNCTAD. These estimates add FDI in a country without 
disaggregating by sectors. As FDI in the manufacturing sector has lost weight in favour of FDI in 
the tertiary sector, in principle it is preferable to use ITC (2013) data. However, we need to make 
sure that this data is consistent. 
 ITC (2013) defines FDI in the same way as UNCTAD. FDI is the increase in the equity 
position of a foreign firm that holds more than 10 percent of the shares of a host country firm. 
FDI includes three elements: equity capital, intra-company loans and reinvested earnings 
(UNCTAD, 2005). 
  This definition has some problems (UNCTAD, 2005)
10
. Firstly, statistics fail to record 
small FDI flows. Due to the intangibility of FDI, statistics are more likely to capture large 
transactions. Consequently with aggregate data we do not take into account the effects of small 
scale investments
11
. Secondly, the 10 percent rule isn´t consistently followed by all countries. 
Third, reporting of the three components of FDI flows isn´t consistent between all countries.  
Some countries do not report intra-company loans, others do not report re-invested earnings and 
a minority report investments of foreign affiliates in the country of the parent firm. Forth and 
most important, FDI data is systematically overestimated due to round-tripping and transhipping 
of FDI in tax havens (UNCTAD, 2005)
12
. Round-tripping is when FDI is channelled to specific 
purpose entities abroad and later returned  back to the original economy in the form of FDI. An 
example is the case of China and Hong Kong. Chinese investors take advantage of the beneficial 
taxation conditions that FDI has in China to invest from firms created under Hong Kong´s laws 
(Seguino, 2007). We account for China´s differenced effect of FDI on wages due to its 
importance but such inferences should be taken with caution. Transhipping is when FDI is 
channelled to specific purpose entities abroad that serve as an intermediary for FDI to other 
countries. For example, 95% of Luxembourg's FDI inflows are estimated to be in transit (ITC, 
2013).  Consequently, the inclusion of these countries is likely to bias our results. We make a 
robustness check by tacking out countries that have been identified as tax havens by the IMF 
(2000) : Cyprus, Ireland and Malta.  
 A specific concern over ITC (2013) data has to do with classification problems. In the 
                                               
10   We record the main issues that affect our estimates. Data compilation of FDI data has many other issues 
concerning different methodological methods of data collection, time periods for recording FDI transactions and 
valuation. These are discussed in more detail in UNCTAD (2005).  
11 This is a potential source for bias shared by all national level FDI estimators. 
12 Tax havens can be defined as countries that "offer an environment conducive to individuals and corporations 
seeking to hide their assets and business activities from government authorities of their home countries" (Seguino, 
2007). 
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case were FDI cannot be classified in a specific sector, it is not counted. Although unclassified 
FDI represents small sums, this varies through countries. We avoid this problem partially by 
making use of sector-level instead of industry-level data. 
 Manufacturing employment and domestic manufacturing capital data comes from 
UNIDO. However, as data availability for domestic manufacturing capital was scarce we 
construct a proxy using total gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) data from the World Bank´s 
World Development Indicators (WDI). We did so by converting GFCF into a stock variable 
using the perpetual inventory method and then multiplying the total domestic capital stock with 
the share of manufacturing value added provided by WDI. The perpetual inventory formula is
13
: 
 
                   where    
     
    
.   
 
 Overall, correlation between manufacturing capital from UNIDO and our proxy variable 
for countries that have both variables is very high (98 percent). Further, we found that our capital 
proxy variable has slightly higher mean and standard deviation. 
 Nominal wages and domestic capital stock are transformed into fixed 2005US$ the same 
way whilst FDI inflows and FDI stock are divided into domestic manufacturing capital stock. 
Firstly, we convert into local currency if not already converted using year average exchange 
rates. Secondly, we deflate the variables using national CPI data indexed for 2005 in order to 
arrive to real terms. Finally, we apply exchange rates from the year 2005 to obtain real wages in 
fixed 2005 US dollars. Data on CPI and exchange rates is contained in the WDI of the World 
Bank.  
 Additionally we used two variables for educational levels and trade openness. For our 
educational variable, we would ideally include secondary school attainment as our educational 
variable. However, school attainment is not available for the selected sample. We result in using 
gross school enrollment which is a proxy of school attainment. Gross secondary school 
enrolment is the total enrolment in secondary education regardless of age
14
. An important 
concern of using school enrollment is that we are not accounting for educational levels in the 
manufacturing sector and most importantly, we do not differ between actual levels of attainment 
nor for education quality. 
 Trade openness measures to what extend a country is integrated in the global economy, 
                                               
13 Formula for proxy initial capital stock is found in Hall and Jones (1999). 
14 Consequently, this percentage can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of people over-aged or under aged people in 
education. 
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and thus exposed to its effects. It is calculated as the sum of total exports and imports divided 
into total GDP.  
 Finally, we compiled a panel composed of 33 countries with data from 2002 to 2008. 
Unfortunately data is not available for all countries and years. In order to make a sound analysis 
we resulted to drop countries with insufficient number of observations
15
. 
Countries are divided into 4 different groups. First we reduce our sample to control for possible 
distortions produced by tax havens. We include two additional samples to investigate the effects 
of FDI in OECD countries and developing countries. Sample groups are presented in Table 2.  
  
                                               
15 In order to avoid losing too many observations, we conducted selected interpolation for FDI STOCK, EDUC, 
EMP and OPEN variables. The rule was to do linear interpolation in the case where one or two values are missing. 
In the case of employment, we additionally imputed nearest preceding and following values for missing 
observations because this variable has no clear trend. 
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Table 2. Sample Groups and Observation Period 
                                               
16 Data on China should be taken with caution due to miss-measurements as well as missing observations. We 
retrieved additional information from China´s MOFCOM (2013) in order to provide better estimates of FDI inflows 
and stock. However, we finally decided to leave these estimations out due to lack of comparability with ITC (2013) 
data. We proceeded with the same imputation methodology as with the other variables.  
17 World Bank defines as developing countries those with GNI per capita of US$11,905 or less in 2010. Accordingly 
we use this classification.  
Sample Groups Countries 
Included 
(Number of 
countries) 
Countries 
ALL  (32) Armenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, China
16
, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macao,  F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic 
of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, Thailand and 
United States of America. 
ALL EXCEPT 
TAX HAVENS 
 (29) All except Cyprus, Ireland and Malta. 
OECD (17) Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sweden 
and United States of America. 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
17
 
 (9) Armenia, Bulgaria, China, Kazakhstan, Lithuania,  
F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Peru, Russian Federation and 
Thailand. 
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4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section we provide an overview of the variables used in our panel. We additionally 
describe the trends in wages and FDI for our selected group samples.  
Table 3 provides a summary statistics of key variables. Statistics presented describe our sample 
and in any case they should be understood as representative of the whole world. We present our 
variables in levels for a more comprehensive understanding of variable magnitudes. The first two 
variables are the Average Monthly Wages in real terms of 2005 US  
dollars. Average wage earnings per month between 2002 and 2008 added  1756.64 US dollars 
for UNIDO data. However, according to ILO data, the same concept is estimated to be of 
1589.60 US dollars. These estimations are rather high which indicate the unequal presence 
between developed and developing countries. However, we should take into account that 
standard deviations are lower for ILO data meaning possible less within-country variation of 
such indicator over time. Mean FDI inflows and FDI stock variables are remarkably high. There 
are two reasons for this. First, FDI inflows and domestic capital come from different sources. 
Second, as previously noted ITC data is systematically overestimated
18
. The correlations among 
the wage, FDI and control variables are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables 
Note: Variables are in levels. Source: Author´s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
18 Problems are described in more detail in the precedent section. 
All years 
Average 
Earnings 
UNIDO 
(2005US$) 
Average 
Wage ILO 
(2005US$) 
FDI 
Inflows 
(share of 
domestic 
capital) 
FDI Stock 
(share of 
domestic 
capital) 
Employment 
(Thousands 
of 
Employees) 
Domestic 
capital 
(Million 
2005US$) 
Open 
(%) 
Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
(Gross, %) 
mean 1756.64 1589.60 4.773058 59.62137 3434.59 222000 60.47 98.38 
stnd. Dev 1523.01 1427.26 6.655104 49.67062 10700.00 590000 67.43 12.50 
min. 53.84 74.04 -8.336095 6.380566 20.32 97.9 0.05 63.92 
max. 5284.18 5522.11 32.62157 385.4481 81500.00 3410000 259.36 143.89 
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Table 4. Correlogram for key variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author´s calculations. 
 
We now analyze the changes in FDI and real wages for our different samples. 
 
4.1.1 Capital trends in the manufacturing sector 
In this section we depict the specific trends of FDI in the manufacturing sector. This analysis is 
done in relation to our sample and in no way should be understood as world representative.  
  In general terms, manufacturing FDI follows the same patterns as overall FDI. FDI stock 
is concentrated in developed countries but increases have concentrated in developing countries. 
Most of it was absorbed by China. However, this is only part of the story. In figure 5 we see the 
evolution of the share of FDI of manufacturing  inflows in relationship to domestic capital in the 
manufacturing sector indexed for the year 2002 whilst figure 6 shows the evolution of the share 
of FDI of manufacturing stock in relationship to domestic capital in the manufacturing sector 
indexed for the year 2002. Conclusions are twofold. Firstly, although FDI in the manufacturing 
sector of developing economies increased, there was a decline in its relative importance due to 
the even greater increase in domestic capital. Secondly, domestic capital growth in OECD 
countries was milder and consequently FDI´s share as a percentage of domestic capital increased 
  
Average 
Earnings 
(UNIDO) 
Average 
Wages 
(ILO) 
FDI 
Inflows 
FDI 
Stock 
Domestic 
capital Employment Education Open 
Average 
Wage 
(UNIDO) 1 
       Average 
Wages (ILO) 0.963 1 
      FDI Inflows -0.319 -0.298 1 
     FDI Stock 0.026 0.020 0.447 1 
    Domestic 
capital -0.103 -0.115 -0.093 -0.160 1 
   Employment 0.246 0.177 -0.165 -0.234 0.532 1 
  Education 0.235 0.170 -0.019 0.077 -0.168 -0.111 1 
 Open 0.723 0.751 -0.176 0.187 -0.337 -0.105 0.291 1 
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as a result of greater investments.  
Figure 5. Average FDI inflows in Million USD for all our sample, OECD and developing countries 2002 - 2008 
Source: Author´s calculations with ITC (2013) Note: Indices are unweighted averages.  
 
 
Figure 6. FDI inflows in Million USD for all our sample, OECD and developing countries 2002 - 2008 
Source: Author´s calculations with ITC (2013) Note: Indices are unweighted averages.  
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4.1.2 Labour workforce trends in the manufacturing sector 
Average real wages have had an unequal evolution between 2002 and 2008 (figure 7). In our 
sample, we observe that real wages in the manufacturing sector have stayed the same. However, 
this is only because of lowering wages in middle income countries. In our distinct samples we 
observe a different pattern. In spite of declining wages from 2002 to 2004, wages in developing 
countries overall increased between 2002 and 2008. OECD countries experienced highest wage 
increases. In average, real wages in OECD countries increased a 2.79% per year. As noted 
above, average monthly wages do not account for the hours worked. Thus, changes in hours 
worked may be behind the evolution of wage patterns.  
 
Figure 7. Average Real Wage Growth for Selected Groups, 2002-2008 (index: 2002=100) 
     Source: Author´s calculations with UNIDO (2013) Note: Indices are unweighted averages.  
 
 We now consider the evolution of average wages with respect to labour productivity. As 
previously shown for all sectors, increased productivity of labour is not transferred into a 
proportional increase in wages. In figure 8 and 9 we can see the cumulative real wage and labour 
productivity growth in developed as well as in OECD countries. Clearly, the gap between 
productivity and compensation of workers is increasing showing probably that gains from 
globalisation are not distributed evenly between capital and labour owners. However, the gap is 
greater in developing than in developed countries. This might be because the link between labour 
productivity and workers wages in developed countries is stronger than in developing countries, 
because of differences industry composition and structural change. 
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Figure 8. Trends in growth in average wages and labour productivity in OECD economies, 2002-2008  (index: 
2002= 100) 
 
 Source: Author´s calculations with ILO (2013) Note: Indices are unweighted averages.  
 
 
Figure 9. Trends in growth in average wages and labour productivity in developing economies, 2002-2008  
(index: 2002= 100) 
 
 Source: Author´s calculations with ILO (2013) Note: Indices are unweighted averages.  
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5 Methods 
5.1 The model 
The impact of FDI on the labour market can be studied in the standard labour framework. Here 
we benefit from developments made by Aitken et al. (1996), Mehmet and Tavakoli (2003). The 
neoclassical economic specification developed by Aitken et al. (1996) derives from the standard 
production function
19
: 
                                                                    (1) 
 
where Y, L and K are total output, labour and capital stock respectively. We derive equation (1) 
and assume that the initial technological parameter      equals one: 
 
                                                                 (2) 
 
where lowercase letters indicate rates of variable change. Thus,   and    represent the elasticity 
of labour and capital respectively.    represents the endogenous change of technology which is 
dependent on FDI share (      which is FDI divided by total Output. The resulting equation 
after substituting both terms is as follows: 
 
                                                               (3)  
 
Where the effect of    is expected to be positive and    is expected to be negative. The 
equilibrium in the labour market corresponds to the following equation: 
 
                                                       (4) 
 
Where W represents wages, P is prices, K is capital and L is Labour. If we divide prices in both 
sides we get real wages where higher amounts of capital increase labour productivity and thus 
wages: 
                             (5) 
 
                                               
19 Neoclassical wage equations typically include factors that affect productivity i.e. the labour force and the capital 
available to work with a general price level for the economy (e.g. Teckan, 2010; Onaran and Stockhammer, 2006; 
Tintin, 2012). 
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 Where the effect of     is expected to be positive and    is expected to be negative. The 
issue relies on the sign of   . However, alternative specifications from the economic growth 
literature suggest that the model specification provided in equation (5) lacks two important 
variables: education and trade openness. 
 Education is potentially an important factor affecting labour productivity. From the 
political economy perspective, the more educated workers are, the greater bargaining power they 
will have (Seguino, 2007). From the neoclassic point of view, education also has a positive effect 
on wages as higher education leads to greater productivity of labour.   
6 Empirical analysis 
Taking into account the three approaches listed in the previous sections, we can estimate the 
effect of FDI on manufacturing wages in the following way:  
 
 
                                                               
                                                       (6) 
  
 
where    is the Average Monthly Wage in the Manufacturing Sector of country i at time t and 
              and             are FDI inflows and stock as a share of domestic capital in 
the manufacturing sector.           and       are respectively domestic capital and 
employment in the manufacturing sector.        and        measure educational levels and 
international trade openness. Additionally, we include two dummy variables that take into 
account the specific effects of FDI inflows and FDI stock on wages for the case of China. This 
is: 
 
                           where j=China (7) 
                          where j=China (8) 
 
Interpretations of    and    coefficients are straightforward. A positive (negative) sign means 
respectively that FDI inflows and FDI stock have positive (negative) effects on wages. 
Specifically a positive sign of    means that keeping other factors constant (manufacturing 
capital included), an increase in 1 percent in the share of FDI inflows to domestic capital 
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increases wages in a          percent. Alternatively a positive sign of    means that keeping 
other factors constant, an increase in 1 percent in the share of FDI inflows to domestic capital 
increases wages in a          percent. The effect of FDI inflows on wages in China is the sum 
of   and   . The effect of FDI stock on wages in China is the sum of   and     
 We gathered data of the variables for a total of 33 countries over the period 2002-2008
20
. 
Data limitations have forced us to work with such small number of countries. With such a 
limited number of countries we can estimate our model with pool OLS or with the panel OLS 
method. For all of our specified models, we test that our variables are highly correlated to 
individual specific unobserved effects and decide to use panel OLS procedures with fixed effects 
(FE). 
 The advantage of panel data is that it allows conducting analysis for a heterogeneous 
number of countries (Baltagi, 2001). Additionally it allows for more observations, better 
precision and higher power than in standard OLS estimation
21
.  
6.1 Results 
In this section, we present the results from the estimation of the effects of FDI in average 
manufacturing. First, we present estimation results for UNIDO Earnings data. Second, we 
conduct alternative estimations with ILO wage data. 
6.1.1 Results for UNIDO Earnings data 
According to the results reported in table 5, we find mixed evidence on the effect of FDI on 
earnings. Estimators for FDI stock are statistically significant at a 1 percent significance level. 
This result is found to be consistent for the different specifications of the full sample and when 
we rule out tax havens. For example, in the first specification of the full sample we see that 
ceteris paribus, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of FDI stock to domestic capital leads 
to a 0.17 percentage point growth in average manufacturing wages.  
 FDI inflows however show opposite results. We find that a 1 percentage increase in the 
FDI inflows to domestic capital share decreases manufacturing wages by 0.3 percent. However, 
we find FDI inflows is statistically significant at a 10 percent level when FDI stock is included.  
 Then again, we do not find any significant effects for OECD nor for developing 
countries. Both FDI have a significant and negative effect in China. An increase in 1 percentage 
point in the share of FDI stock to domestic capital stock leads to a 3.8 percentage decline in 
                                               
20 For a detailed explanation on data construction please refer to the data section 
21 To account for country and time fixed effects in the error term, equation 6 is estimated using country and time 
effects in the error term. We additionally conducted a Haussmann test to see whether Random Effects perform better 
but this wasn´t the case. 
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Chinese manufacturing wages. 
 Our control variables were found to have different levels of significance. Employment 
and Domestic capital have the predicted effects found in literature. An increase in the labour 
force has a negative effect on wages, indicating that the expansion of employment hold's down 
wages. The coefficient is significantly negative in the case of developing countries, indicating 
greater elasticity demand for labour for countries in that sample.  
 An increase in the percentage of population in secondary education does not have a 
significant effect on wages. However, labour literature in the past has had problems in finding 
this relationship significant (Seguino, 2007). Similarly, openness has not been found to have an 
effect on wages
22
.   
6.1.1 Results for ILO Wage data 
Estimations of the effects of FDI on manufacturing wages from ILO are reported in table 6. 
These confirm the mixed findings we found in table 5.  
 The obtained estimators for FDI stock show a positive relationship between this variable 
and wages as well as a negative relationship between FDI inflows and wages. However, 
estimations for ILO wage data show smaller size of the estimates. This may be due to lower 
within country variation of ILO wage data. This is due to lower within-country variation of 
wages. 
  A 1 percentage point increase in the share of FDI stock to domestic capital leads to a 0.14 
percentage increase in manufacturing wages. Estimations confirm that neither FDI stock nor FDI 
inflows have an effect on developing countries. Additionally, we see the significance of labour 
elasticity in developing countries. 
  In contrast with table 5, here we find that FDI inflows have a negative impact on wages 
in the OECD sample. Alternatively, we find a smaller but positive impact of FDI stock.   
 Estimations also show a negative relationship between FDI and wages in China. As 
before, estimates of the effect of FDI inflows are less big but still considerable. However, it 
appears that FDI does not have positive effects on Chinese workers’ wages. 
                                               
22 Estimations were conducted without these factors but results estimators do not change much. 
 Table 5. Fixed effects estimation with UNIDO Earnings Data 
Dependent variable: Average Monthly Real Earnings in logged form. 
  ALL   ALL EXCEPT TAX HAVENS   OECD   DEVELOPING 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
      
 
      
 
      
 
      
Ln Employment -0.4161 -0.4331 -0.1504 
 
-0.6082** -0.5678* -0.2567 
 
-0.1915 -0.1967 -0.1840 
 
-1.4738** -1.3701* -1.4439** 
 
(0.2632) (0.2726) (0.3236) 
 
(0.2779) (0.2870) (0.3545) 
 
(0.1730) (0.1753) (0.1659) 
 
(0.5011) (0.6070) (0.5206) 
Ln Capital 0.3910*** 0.3897*** 0.2723** 
 
0.4299*** 0.4233*** 0.2591** 
 
0.3484** 0.3409** 0.3440** 
 
0.4604* 0.4353* 0.4361** 
 
(0.0801) (0.0833) (0.1125) 
 
(0.0919) (0.0954) (0.1210) 
 
(0.1428) (0.1425) (0.1382) 
 
(0.2072) (0.2104) (0.1532) 
Openness 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 
 
0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 
-0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 
-0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0005 
 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
 
(0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0041) 
Secondary Education 0.0515 0.0898 0.0076 
 
-0.0711 -0.0209 -0.0503 
 
0.0643 0.0681 0.0643 
 
-0.2109 0.0186 -0.0281 
 
(0.1965) (0.2082) (0.2091) 
 
(0.1518) (0.1718) (0.1854) 
 
(0.1001) (0.1035) (0.0986) 
 
(0.9301) (0.9767) (0.9870) 
FDI Inflows  -0.0030* 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.0031* 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.0016 
 
-0.0014* 
 
-0.0028 
 
-0.0012 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0017) 
 
(0.0018) 
 
(0.0022) 
 
(0.0009) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0014) 
FDI Stock  0.0017*** 0.0015*** 
  
0.0021*** 0.0019*** 
  
0.0001 -0.0000 
  
0.0026 0.0016 
 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) 
  
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
  
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
  
(0.0022) (0.0017) 
 FDI Inflows*China 
    
-0.6188*** 
 
-0.5124*** 
     
-0.9084*** 
 
-0.9176*** 
     
(0.1050) 
 
(0.1296) 
     
(0.1463) 
 
(0.1494) 
FDI Stock*China 
    
-0.0403*** 0.0119*** -0.0305*** 
     
-0.0580*** 0.0185** -0.0555*** 
     
(0.0064) (0.0030) (0.0080) 
     
(0.0089) (0.0058) (0.0092) 
                Observations 208 208 208   189 189 189   110 110 110   57 57 57 
R-squared 0.6476 0.6329 0.5724 
 
0.6811 0.6558 0.5913 
 
0.7089 0.7012 0.7080 
 
0.7596 0.7156 0.7460 
Number of country 32 32 32   29 29 29   17 17 17   9 9 9 
Source: Author´s calculations with UNIDO (2012) data. 
Note: Model (1): FDI inflows and FDI stock included. Model (2): FDI stock included. Model (3): FDI inflows included. 
Robust standard  errors in parentheses.  Linear time trend not reported.     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 6. Fixed effects estimation with ILO Wage Data 
Dependent variable: Average Monthly Real Wage in logged form. 
Source: Author´s calculations with ILO (2012) data. 
Note: Model (1): FDI inflows and FDI stock included. Model (2): FDI stock included. Model (3): FDI inflows included. 
Robust standard  errors in parentheses.  Linear time trend not reported.     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  ALL   ALL EXCEPT TAX HAVENS   OECD   DEVELOPING 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
       
 
      
 
      
 
      
Ln Employment -0.3151 -0.3292 -0.1062 
 
-0.4082* -0.3823* -0.1586 
 
0.0820 0.0747 0.1179 
 
-0.9071* -0.8504 -0.8974* 
 (0.2059) (0.2103) (0.2495) 
 
(0.2015) (0.2078) (0.2505) 
 
(0.2096) (0.2135) (0.2003) 
 
(0.4064) (0.4601) (0.4110) 
Ln Capital 0.3770*** 0.3759*** 0.2837*** 
 
0.3633*** 0.3589*** 0.2420** 
 
0.2930 0.2825 0.2719 
 
0.4583 0.4384 0.4505 
 (0.0791) (0.0807) (0.0990) 
 
(0.0881) (0.0897) (0.0975) 
 
(0.1719) (0.1705) (0.1712) 
 
(0.2668) (0.2546) (0.2579) 
Openness 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 
0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 
 
0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 
-0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
 
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Secondary Education -0.1351 -0.1033 -0.1696 
 
-0.1431 -0.1013 -0.1283 
 
0.0202 0.0254 0.0200 
 
-0.5656 -0.3640 -0.5069 
 (0.1708) (0.1790) (0.2052) 
 
(0.1488) (0.1613) (0.1787) 
 
(0.1186) (0.1246) (0.1230) 
 
(0.7528) (0.7370) (0.6915) 
FDI Inflows  -0.0025* 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0029* 
 
-0.0017 
 
-0.0022** 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.0026 
 
-0.0021 
 (0.0013) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0018) 
 
(0.0009) 
 
(0.0008) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0016) 
FDI Stock  0.0014*** 0.0012*** 
  
0.0015*** 0.0013*** 
  
0.0007** 0.0004* 
  
0.0008 -0.0001 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
  
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
  
(0.0003) (0.0002) 
  
(0.0018) (0.0016) 
 FDI Inflows*China 
    
-0.4183*** 
 
-0.3427*** 
     
-0.6526*** 
 
-0.6556*** 
 
    
(0.0860) 
 
(0.1019) 
     
(0.1507) 
 
(0.1462) 
FDI Stock*China 
    
-0.0259*** 0.0094*** -0.0189*** 
     
-0.0390*** 0.0164** -0.0381*** 
 
    
(0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0060) 
     
(0.0083) (0.0049) (0.0090) 
                               
Observations 208 208 208 
 
189 189 189 
 
110 110 110 
 
57 57 57 
R-squared 0.5402 0.5285 0.4868 
 
0.5985 0.5770 0.5428 
 
0.5671 0.5518 0.5467 
 
0.6702 0.6358 0.6684 
Number of country 32 32 32   29 29 29   17 17 17   9 9 9 
  Taking into account results from estimations on earnings and wages, none of the 
approaches analyzed give a good explanation on the effects of FDI in the totality of our 
sample. Whilst there is preliminary evidence in favour of the neoclassical approach in the 
effect of FDI stock on manufacturing wages, there is no such evidence of positive effects of 
FDI inflows on wages. How can me reconcile both facts? Both in the political economy and 
in the neoclassical approach FDI stock measures the genuine effect of FDI existent in an 
economy. It can be understood as confronting more rigid structures as it suffers transaction 
costs. Consequently we could understand this as FDI of better quality. On the other hand, FDI 
inflows can be particularly indicative of the unstable nature of global capital movements. 
Consequently, results should be taken with caution. Additionally, FDI inflows could respond 
to short term features of capital deregulation. Alternatively, it may be showing the negative 
effects of capital dependency or the bargaining power approach as in Vijaya and Kaltani, 
(2007). Thus, a relative variation in FDI inflows could be causing downward pressures on 
wages.  
 Interestingly enough, for developing countries we do not find any statistically 
significant effects of FDI on wages. For China however, we find that FDI has a negative 
effect, providing evidence supporting the political economy and sociology approaches. 
 
6.2 Discussion 
Results in the previous section provide with mixed evidence on the effects of FDI on 
manufacturing wages. Whilst we see positive effects of FDI stock on wages and negative 
effects of FDI inflows on wages we should be cautious of what this entails. Alternatively, the 
negative correlation between FDI and wages in China is of great interest. In order to assess 
the validity of our findings we should put in place certain limitations that potentially may 
affect our results. 
 
Limitation 1: mismeasurements 
International wage data suffers from multiple definitions susceptible to individual country 
standards which might lead to mismeasurements. Additionally, wage variables suffer from 
underestimation of wage decreases due to composition effects (ILO, 2013). However, a bigger 
concern relates to the mismeasurement FDI data due to round-tripping and transhipping 
(Seguino, 2007). Such problems if systematic could cause bias our estimations. We attempt to 
control for this problem by excluding tax havens from our sample. However, these problems 
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may persist. Another problem of mismeasurement consists in estimating the effect of FDI on 
manufacturing wages with aggregate estimations of FDI instead of using FDI  in the 
manufacturing sector (for ex.Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007). This study makes use of data of FDI 
in the manufacturing sector. However, the drawback of such variable measure is when 
manufacturing wages are being affected by changes in FDI composition of other sectors. 
 
Limitation 2: omitted variable bias. 
In our estimations, we included secondary school enrolment. An argument for the inclusion of 
this variable is that higher education incorporates greater labour productivity as well as higher 
bargaining power of workers (Seguino, 2007). However, in most cases we haven´t found 
significance of education. Further research should take into account additional fields. For 
example, this study does not control for industry-specific variations. FDI is likely to affect 
labour-intensive industries in a different way than capital-intensive industries (Onaran and 
Stockhammer, 2008). It would have been useful to conduct assessments with this data since it 
is likely that the effect of FDI on wages is more obvious in countries with more FDI in the 
manufacturing sector. Increased upgrading of tasks in manufacture requires higher skills for 
workers. Comparing manufacturing wages has become increasingly difficult as there is a wide 
diversity in the tasks carried out by workers in the manufacturing sector, depending on the 
sophistication of their products and tasks. 
 
Limitation 3: reverse causality.  
The RTB hypothesis predicts that the lowering of wages in a country will lead to higher FDI 
inflows. Thus, capital deregulation may generate greater competition for attracting capital 
(Drezner, 2006). In order to solve part of endogeneity problems, we make use of a panel 
(OLS) with FE and control for additional variables which might bias our results. However, we 
might want to be cautious as estimators need to be strictly exogenous. This way, future 
research should consider to explore IV and GMM techniques.  
 
Limitation 4: different samples.  
Finally, the last concern deals with the utilization of different samples to conduct inferences. 
Results could respond to systematic differences in our samples. This way, results concerning 
the OECD economies and  developing countries should be taken as purely indicative.  
 
 To sum up, we have found mixed findings on the effect of FDI on wages in the 
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manufacturing sector. However, we do not find evidence that FDI has neither a positive or 
negative causal effect on wages. In this sense we should speak in terms of correlations. 
 The picture that emerges is that of a globalizing world in which FDI has unequal 
effects on wages between different samples of countries. Whilst there is mixed evidence on 
the effect of FDI in our sample, if we consider only developing countries we did not find 
significant effects of FDI on wages. Even more striking, we find that FDI does not have 
positive effects in China. In the sample including all countries as well as that without tax 
haven´s there appears to be some positive correlation. However, the question is what 
characteristics a country has to have in order to perceive such technology spilovers. In this 
sense, further research is needed. 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
 The present master thesis aims to answer the following research question: what is the 
impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on average wages? To this aim, we analyze the 
effects of FDI inflows and FDI stock on wages in the manufacturing sector and conceptualize 
existing literature on the topic. Mainstream economic literature has openly argued in favour of 
FDI, underscoring that additionally to increased capital, foreign investment operates as a 
channel of technology diffusion that leads to permanent higher labour productivity and wages 
(Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2005). In contrast, a heterogeneous group of scholars, ranging from 
sociologists to political economists have stressed that foreign investment decreases bargaining 
power of labour causing a decline on wages (Seguino, 2007; Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007). 
 To test the validity of these approaches, we constructed a panel of 33 countries further 
disaggregating samples into OECD economies and developing countries. We find mixed 
evidence on the effect of FDI on wages in the manufacturing sector. FDI stock has positive 
effects on manufacturing wages, when found statistically significant. This provides 
preliminary evidence to support the neoclassical approach.  
 On the other hand, when significant, FDI inflows are found to have negative effects on 
manufacturing wages. We do not find evidence that FDI has any effect on manufacturing 
wages in developing countries. Consequently, economists and policy-makers should be more 
cautious when making assumptions on the positive effects of FDI.  
 This study has three major limitations. Firstly, FDI is likely to suffer from systematic 
mismeasurements. To control this, we decided to exclude tax havens in one of our 
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specifications. Secondly, there might be omitted variable bias. We included additional 
variables to account for this problem. Thirdly, our variables of interest might suffer from 
reverse causality. This is, the reduction of wages might attract further FDI. Results should be 
therefore taken with caution. 
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Annexes 
 
Data annex  description 
Symbol Variable Data Source Unit of Scale 
AW Real Monthly Average Wage 
UNIDO and 
ILO 2005US$ 
EMP Employment UNIDO 
Number of employees (in 
thousands) 
FDI-
FLOW 
FDI inward flows as a share of domestic capital 
stock 
ITC and 
WDI % 
FDI-
STOCK 
FDI inward stock as a share of domestic capital 
stock 
ITC and 
WDI % 
K Domestic capital stock 
UNIDO 
WDI 2005US$ 
EDUC School enrollment, secondary (gross) WDI % 
OPEN Openness  [(Exports +Imports)/GDP] WDI % 
 
 
 
Annex 1. Scatter plot of wages in logged form against FDI stock variable, mean values, 2002-
2008 
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Annex 2. Scatter plot of wages in logged form against FDI inflows variable mean, 2002-2008 
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